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Abstract 
 
In this work, I run cross-country regression to estimate the impact of the expected 
fiscal bailout cost (in 2020) and effectiveness of the containment measures (applied 
in the first half of 2020) on the gap between economic growth forecasts prior and 
after the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic (up to 2021). The estimation results 
confirm conjecture about the positive impact of expected bailout cost and negative 
impact of effectiveness in the implementation of containment measures on 
reduction of short-term growth gap, but not in the case of cumulative growth gap 
over the period 2020-2021. These results indicate that government fiscal spending 
in the future needs to be more focused on bottleneck sectors and activities that 
impede growth, as well as to be more supportive toward strengthening healthcare 
protection against COVID-19, especially when limited fiscal space and current 
expectations about slow economic recovery are taken into consideration.  
 
Keywords: economic growth, COVID-19, bailout, containment measures, cross-
country regression analysis 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the global economy has been 
struggling with an economic downturn caused by containment measures urgently 
applied by the national governments to save population health. The containment 
measures have been effective in saving people health and lives (Deb et al., 2020b), 
but also entail large short-term economic costs (Deb et al., 2020a).  
 
The economic crises, wars and pandemics are the most frequent causes of 
prolonged economic downturns both on national and global levels. While the 
impact of global crises on economic growth has been well documented and 
examined, in particular due to the recent global crisis 2008/2009, the impact of a 
global pandemic on economic growth is still a big puzzle. The statistical evidence 
on the impact of a global pandemic on economic activities is scarce, since the 
Spanish flu (the most recent case of a global pandemic), happened hundred years 
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ago and immediately after the Great War, making even harder for historians and 
economists to distinguish effects of a pandemic from effects of war.  
 
Jorda et al. (2020), in one of the rare empirical studies on the subject, found that 
real GDP per capita and the real rate of return on assets have different long-term 
responses after pandemics and wars. In wars, capital is destroyed so the rate of 
return remains high for decades and recovery is going slow; on the other hand, 
capital is preserved during pandemics, so real rate of return may remain negative 
for a prolonged period, while economic recovery is much faster than in case of 
wars.  
 
However, COVID-19 pandemic outbreaks only twelve years after the world 
economy was hit by the biggest economic crisis in recent history. One of the 
legacies of the global economic crisis is low and even negative real interest rates, 
that limit the expansive response of monetary policy due to zero lower bound on 
nominal interest rates. Hence, the majority of the countries have engaged in large-
scale discretionary fiscal interventions to prevent economic activities from total 
collapse. Anderson et al. (2020) grouped fiscal measures undertaken to save the 
economy into three categories: immediate fiscal impulses, deferrals (postponed 
payments of taxes and other contributions) and liquidity provisions and 
guarantees. These measures have a different impact on government accounting 
positions: fiscal impulses immediately increase expenditure, deferrals immediately 
reduce revenues, while guarantees have no immediate impact, but can deteriorate 
fiscal balance in the future if the contingent liabilities are activated. 
 
In this paper, I am primarily interested in the expected impact of immediate fiscal 
impulses, i.e. discretionary increase in government expenditure (henceforth 
denoted as fiscal bailout cost), on expectations about short- to mid-term economic 
growth, after controlling growth for the effects of containment measures. The 
main objective of this paper is an empirical cross-country examination whether the 
growth expectations match up with country-specific fiscal bailout measures 
undertaken to offset severe effects of COVID-19 pandemic on economic activity. 
Due to the very limited availability of the data (especially actual) I developed a 
parsimonious model which relies on expectations and does not require extensive 
dataset for the empirical estimation. The paper is structured as follows. The 
second section provides an empirical strategy of the cross-country economic 
growth modelling. The third section presents and discusses descriptive statistics 
and results of the model estimation. The last section summarizes the main 
concluding observations and policy recommendations. 
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EMPIRICAL STRATEGY  
The objective of this section is twofold: i) to develop cross-country empirical model 
that relates expected economic growth in a time of pandemic to the projected 
costs of fiscal bailout interventions and effectiveness of containment measures; ii) 
to set up a methodological framework for the quantitative assessment of the 
model variables based on the information sets available.  
 
The empirical modelling of the cross-country economic growth in existing 
literature mainly originates from the Convergence Hypothesis. It relies on the 
Solow-Swan neoclassical model of growth that asserts convergence of the 
economy toward the long-run equilibrium, whereby the pace of economic growth 
depends on the pace of convergence of capital intensity (capital per worker) 
toward steady-state of the economy. In this basic setting, the unconditional 
convergence approach assumes the common steady-state for all countries, which 
in turn implies that cross-country variations in the pace of economic growth over a 
specific period are solely explained by the cross-country differences in the initial 
level of capital intensity. Nevertheless, Barro in his influential empirical study on 
cross-country growth determinants (1991) showed that such an approach is 
oversimplified and popularized the use of conditional convergence approach in 
econometric analysis of economic growth. 
 
The conditional convergence approach in empirical modelling assumes country-
specific steady-state, so that pace of economic growth is conditional to all 
variables that are likely to influence steady-state. The generic empirical 
specification of the cross-country growth model based on the conditional 
convergence approach, such as in Barro (1991), reads as 
 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 ln�𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 �+ 𝛾𝛾𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡,  (1) 
 
with the following notation of the variables: 
 
• 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡+ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  is a cumulative growth rate of country i GDP per capita h-period 
ahead; 
• 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝  is a GDP per capita initial level (lower initial levels implies higher 
growth rates); 
• 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a vector of explanatory variables; 
• 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is a random error assumed to be non-correlated, homoscedastic, and 
normally distributed. 
 
The main advantage of conditional convergence approach lies in its flexibility, since 
any variable that arguably impacts the steady-state of the economy may enter the 
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model. This also holds for relevant non-economic variables, for instance, variables 
that depict political or institutional characteristics of the country, membership to 
regional unions, etc.  
 
Existing research usually confirms that variables which are proxy for inputs in 
production function (like school enrolment rate, capital formation, R&D expenses) 
are significant predictors of cross-country variations in economic growth, in line 
with theoretical expectations that these variables determine country-specific 
steady-state of the economy. However, numerous studies found that control 
variables other than those from production function also have predictive power in 
explaining growth variations, including fiscal variables, such as level of public debt 
(Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010) or share of government expenditures (Barro, 1989), as 
well as non-economic variables such as level of corruption (Mo, 2000).  
 
Application of the conditional convergence growth model in this paper requires 
several adjustments and simplifying assumptions. At first, analysis is focused only 
on short-term growth, i.e. expected growth in 2020 and 2021. Since this is a very 
short period, it is unlikely that the initial level of GDP per capita has predictive 
power of cross-country variations in cumulative GDP growth and can be neglected. 
Secondly, it is assumed that variations in variables theoretically asserted to 
influence country-specific steady-state, like school enrolment rates or capital 
accumulation, as well as non-economic control variables such as political system or 
institutional strengths, are not affected by the pandemic in the short run. Thirdly, 
it is assumed that fiscal bailout to mitigate economic fallout is a one-off cost that 
occurs only in 2020: no bailout is envisaged in 2020. Finally, bearing in mind the 
recent research about economic effects of COVID-19 containment measures (Deb 
et al., 2020a), it is also assumed that containment measures undertaken in 2020 
are relevant variables in explaining cross-country variations of growth. 
 
Following the previous set of assumptions, cross-country growth model reads as 
 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,20 + 𝛾𝛾𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,20 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ,   ℎ = {0,1}, (2) 
 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,20 refers to the vector of explanatory variables not affected by the 
pandemic and 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,20 refers to the vector of explanatory variables which values are 
induced by the pandemic, in particular fiscal bailout cost and containment 
measures. 
 
Since I am dealing with estimations and forecasts instead of actual data, the model 
is further reformulated in terms of expectations conditional on information set 
available in 2020: 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 |𝐼𝐼20� = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼20�+ 𝛾𝛾𝐸𝐸�𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼20�+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ,   ℎ = {0,1}, (3) 
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The further simplification of the model is derived from the assumption that 
variations in explanatory variables determining country-specific steady-state are 
not affected by the pandemic. This implies that forecasts of these variables from 
2019 do not change in 2020, since they are robust to shocks triggered by the 
pandemic, 𝐸𝐸�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼19� = 𝐸𝐸�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼20�. Under the additional assumption that 
variables determining country-specific steady-state explain the majority of 
variations in cross-country growth, the expected contribution of these variables in 
explaining growth can be approximated by the expected growth rates from 2019, 
 𝛽𝛽𝐸𝐸�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ|𝐼𝐼19� ≅ 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 |𝐼𝐼19�. (4) 
 
If the expected growth from 2019 is added to the LHS of the equation, the model 
can be rewritten as 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾𝐸𝐸�𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼20�+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,2020,   ℎ = {0,1}, (5) 
 
where 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � refers to the difference between growth rates expectations 
from 2020 and 2019, 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 � = 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 |𝐼𝐼20� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝 |𝐼𝐼19�, (6) 
 
which is further denoted as “expected growth gap” due to pandemic. 
 
After model development, the main remaining issue is how to quantify expected 
fiscal bailout cost and application of containment measures. To quantify expected 
fiscal bailout cost, I assume that expected fiscal balance in 2020 can be considered 
as a one-off rise in government expenditure due to the fiscal measures undertaken 
to preserve economic activity in the time of the pandemic. Since the fiscal bailout 
cost was not possible to anticipate in 2019, it can be assessed as an expected 
shock in government expenditure in 2020 relative to 2019 expectations. It can be 
quantitatively formulated in relative terms (as a % of GDP) as 
 𝐸𝐸[𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓20] = 𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦20|𝐼𝐼20] − 𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦20|𝐼𝐼19], (7) 
 
whereby equation variables read as 
 
• 𝐸𝐸[𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓20] – expected fiscal bailout cost in 2020, in % of GDP; 
• 𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦20|𝐼𝐼20] – expected government expenditure in 2020 conditional on 
information set available in 2020, in % of GDP; 
• 𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦20|𝐼𝐼19] – expected government expenditure conditional on information 
set available in 2019, in % of GDP. 
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The containment measures applied by national governments include various types 
of closures and restrictions, such as school, workplace and public transportation 
closures and restrictions on public events organization, international travels, or 
internal movements (Deb et al., 2020b). The simplest way to quantify a single 
containment measure would be the definition of a dummy variable that shows 
whether this measure has been applied or not. However, following the rationale of 
making a parsimonious model, I consider the aggregate effectiveness of the 
applied containment measures per country rather than directly measuring 
whether each containment measure is applied or not. Since the association of 
containment measures and flattening of the pandemic curve has been empirically 
confirmed (Deb et al., 2020b), it is reasonable to assume that effectiveness of 
containment measures can be approximated by the variables depicting 
consequences of COVID-19 pandemic on population health. 
 
The assessment of the values of fiscal bailout cost and containment measures 
effectiveness is largely dependent on the data availability. In this work, I use two 
datasets: the IMF data from the World Economic Outlook (October 2019 and April 
2020) and the World Health Organization data on Coronavirus decease. The 
October 2019 WEO dataset contains the usual set of macroeconomic variables 
with mid-term forecasts, including government expenditure. On the other hand, 
due to high level of uncertainty, the most recent April 2020 WEO dataset is limited 
only to short-term forecasts (2020, 2021) of the basic macroeconomic variables: 
GDP, inflation, government fiscal balance (net lending/borrowing) and current 
account balance. To assess expected fiscal bailout cost, it is necessary to assess 𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦2020|𝐼𝐼2020], while 𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦2020|𝐼𝐼2019] is already available in October 2019 WEO 
database.  
 
The assessment of missing values on 𝐸𝐸[𝑦𝑦2020|𝐼𝐼2019] is based on several set of 
assumptions: 
 
• The expected value of government revenue in 2020 consists solely of 
expected structural value and cyclical-adjustment due to fallout of 
economic activity (deferrals or any other possible one-off changes in 
revenues not related to cyclical-adjustment are neglected); 
• The expected value of government expenditure in 2020 consists solely of 
expected structural value and one-off fiscal bailout (any other source of 
cyclical-adjustment other than pandemic rescue expenses are neglected); 
• Unit elasticity of government revenue to GDP. 
 
The latest assumption implies that a change of revenues is proportional to a 
change in GDP, 
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(∆𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1⁄ )
(∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1⁄ ) = 1, (8) 
 
where 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 and 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 are government revenue and GDP at current prices, respectively. 
This implies that growth rates of government revenue 𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 and nominal GDP 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 
are equal,  
 𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡, (9) 
 
where 𝑟𝑟𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = ∆𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1⁄  and 𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡 = ∆𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1⁄ . Since the nominal fiscal balance 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡  
equals the difference between total revenues and expenditures, 𝐵𝐵𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡, it 
can be expressed in a relative term as  
 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 . (10) 
 
The previous equation can be further rewritten as 
 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1(1+𝑟𝑟𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡)𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1(1+𝑦𝑦𝑔𝑔𝑡𝑡) − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡. (11) 
 
Under the assumption of unit elasticity of revenue, the previous equation reads as 
 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡−1𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝐺𝐺𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡 = 𝑟𝑟𝑡𝑡−1 − 𝑦𝑦𝑡𝑡. (12) 
 
In the particular context of this analysis, this can be rewritten in terms of 
expectations as 
 𝐸𝐸⌊𝑦𝑦20|𝐼𝐼20⌋ = 𝑟𝑟19 − 𝐸𝐸⌊𝑓𝑓20|𝐼𝐼20⌋, (13) 
 
which is possible to compute since data on both 𝑟𝑟19 and 𝐸𝐸⌊𝑓𝑓20|𝐼𝐼20⌋ are available in 
April 2020 WEO dataset. 
 
The dataset of the WHO on Coronavirus decease contains two types of data: cases 
of COVID-19 deceases and deaths. Since the effectiveness of the containment 
measures is inversely related to the number of decease and death cases, two 
indicators of the containment measures are computed: effectiveness of 
containment measures in preventing COVID-19 decease cases 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶20, and 
effectiveness of containment measures in preventing COVID-19 death cases 𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶20. 
Both indicators are computed as the inverse of the cumulative cases of decease 
and deaths per million persons on August 31, 2020 (data on population are 
retrieved from October 2019 WEO and assumed to be unchanged in 2020), 
rescaled by multiplying with 1,000 and 100, respectively, due to very low non-
scaled values of indicators.  
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Since the data on GDP per capita in constant prices are not available in April 2020 
WEO dataset, real GDP per capita growth rates are approximated by the usual real 
GDP growth rates. Hence, cumulative expected growth gaps for 2020 and 2021 are 
assessed, respectively, as 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20� = 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼20� − 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼19�, (14) 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,21� = ��1 + 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼20���1 + 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,21|𝐼𝐼20�� − 1� −  ��1 + 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼19���1 + 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,21|𝐼𝐼19�� − 1�. (15) 
 
Based on the previous discussion about the concrete definition of explanatory 
variables, the empirical model can be rewritten as 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ� = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐸𝐸�𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼20�+ 𝛾𝛾2𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,20 +  𝛾𝛾3𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,20 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ,   ℎ = {0,1}, (16) 
 
Eventually, I took into consideration frequent findings from empirical literature 
that impact of fiscal variables (typically level of public debt) on economic growth is 
non-linear, such as in Checherita and Rother (2010). These findings get along with 
theoretical assumption on debt-stabilizing level of government deficit; running the 
fiscal deficit beyond stabilizing threshold is a usual sign of deep structural 
economic problems that limits growth prospective. Extension of the model to 
include non-linear fiscal impact leads to the final form of the empirical 
specification: 
 𝐸𝐸�𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ� = 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛾𝛾1𝐸𝐸�𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼20�+ 𝛾𝛾2𝐸𝐸�𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼20�2 +. 𝛾𝛾3𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,20 + 𝛾𝛾4𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,20 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,20+ℎ,   ℎ = {0,1}, (17) 
 
The expected sign of the impact of each explanatory variable on the dependent 
variable and the corresponding rationale is provided in Table 1: 
 
Table 1: The expected sign of the impact of each explanatory variable on the 
dependent variable 
Variable Expected sign Rationale 𝐸𝐸�𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼20� negative The larger amount of fiscal bailout 
cost implies more expansive fiscal 
policy to stimulate economic 
growth and consequently lower 
growth gap 
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𝐸𝐸�𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖,20|𝐼𝐼20�2 positive Beyond a certain threshold, fiscal 
bailout cost becomes counter-
effective for economic growth  𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,20 positive The more effective 
implementation of containment 
measures implies more restriction 
on economic activity and 
consequently higher growth gap 
𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,20 positive 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The data from the WEO are paired with the WHO data on COVID-19 cases. Only 
countries for which full set of observations on expected growth gaps, bailout cost 
and COVID-19 cases are left in the sample. Hence, the final sample includes 172 
countries. Further examination of the data revealed several expected growth gap 
outliers2, which are excluded from the descriptives computation and regression 
analysis. The full cross-country dataset is given in the Appendix section. 
Descriptive analysis 
The descriptive analysis encompasses expected growth gaps for 2020 and 2021, 
fiscal bailout cost and COVID-19 cases. It is important to notice that for descriptive 
analysis original values of COVID-19 decease cases (CC_pm) and death cases 
(CD_pm) per million persons are considered, rather than their inverted values that 
indicate the effectiveness of containment measures which are pure computational 
variables with no natural and straightforward interpretation. The value of basic 
descriptive statistics is presented in Table 2: 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics 
Variable No. obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
gg20 168 -8.2 4.0 -19.6 1.7 
gg21 170 -5.7 2.4 -13.0 6.6 
fbc 172 4.2 4.2 -18.2 20.8 
CC_pm 172 4,193.4 6,283.7 3.1 43,071.2 
CD_pm 172 109.4 187.8 0.0 1,235.3 
Source: IMF, WHO and author's calculation 
 
2 Values of the expected growth gap higher than 20 p.p. (in absolute terms) are considered as 
outliers, based on the arbitrary selected threshold stemming from the data examination.   
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Note: gg20 – expected real growth in 2020, gg21 –expected cumulative real growth in 
2020-2021, fbc – fiscal bailout cost, CC_pm – COVID-19 cases per million persons, CD_pm – 
COVID-19 deaths per million persons; 
 
The expected growth gap can be thought of as a “net” measure of economic 
downturn, in comparison to the pure GDP growth rate being a “gross” measure of 
economic downturn, which does not count growth potentials that would be most 
likely achieved in case that COVID-1p pandemic didn’t happen. The mean value of 
expected growth gap in 2020 is around 8.2 p.p., meaning that the average real 
growth rate of GDP will be around 8.2 p.p. less than it would be without an 
outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic. This is a huge economic fallout, probably even 
higher than 2009 fallout that follows the outbreak of the global economic crisis. 
Contrary to some expectations, especially at the beginning of the pandemic, that 
economy will bounce back to its potentials already in 2021, the IMF forecasts are 
not so optimistic since the expected cumulative growth gap for 2020-2021 is on 
average 5.7 p.p. less than growth potentials forecasted in 2019.  
 
The expected fiscal bailout cost can be thought of as a one-off expected increase in 
government expenditure that is a result of the expansive fiscal policy measures 
undertaken to mitigate economic fallout. The average expected value of fiscal 
bailout cost is around 4.2% of GDP, indicating that on average 4.2% of the world 
GDP is expected to be spent to save the economy from the collapse. Eventually, 
mean values of COVID-19 decease and death cases indicate that on average 4,193 
persons per million were infected, and 109 persons per million died from the 
consequences of the COVID-19 decease. 
Regression analysis 
Two models are estimated, one for the expected growth gap in 2020, and one for 
the expected cumulative growth gap over the 2020-2021 period. Standard errors 
are corrected to be heteroskedasticity-robust. Table 3. shows the estimation 
results of the first model, wherein the expected growth gap in 2020 is a dependent 
variable. 
 
Table 3: Estimation results, expected growth gap in 2020 model 
E[gg20] Coef. Robust Std. Err. t P>|t| 
E[fbc] -1.0519 0.1894 -5.55 0.000 
E[fbc]2 0.0482 0.0154 3.13 0.002 
CC 0.0102 0.0040 2.56 0.011 
CD -0.0011 0.0024 -0.48 0.633 
_cons -5.3974 0.5306 -10.17 0.000 
Source: Author's calculation 
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Estimation results of the model get along with theoretical expectations given in 
Table 1. If the joint impact of both linear and non-linear fiscal effects is considered, 
increase in expected bailout cost of 1 p.p. implies almost unit reduction of 
expected growth gap in 2020, and this impact is significant at 1% level.  
 
As previously mentioned, indicators of the effectiveness of containment measures 
are artificial variables, and estimated regression coefficients for these two 
variables have no natural quantitative interpretation. Nevertheless, the positive 
sign of regression coefficients can be interpreted as a contribution of containment 
measures to the widening of expected growth gap. The estimated regression 
coefficient for the effectiveness of containment measures in preventing COVID-19 
decease cases appears to have a significant positive impact at 5% level, as 
expected: effective containment measures to flatter pandemic curve reduce 
expected growth. This is not the case with the effectiveness of containment 
measures in preventing COVID-19 death cases, whereby coefficient is both 
negative and insignificant. 
 
The overall explanatory power of the model in absolute terms, measured by R-
squared, does not appear quite high: cross-country variations of explanatory 
variables explained around 25% of variations in growth gap. However, when 
compared to the similar work this is a solid explanatory power bearing in mind the 
parsimonious model specification and size of the sample; for instance, Barro 
(1991) use 8-10 explanatory variables in regression analysis and got R-squared 
values 50-60%. 
 
On the other hand, the estimated impact of the expected fiscal bailout, both linear 
and non-linear, on the expected cumulative growth gap 2020-2021 seems to be 
insignificant, despite regression coefficients still have the proper signs (Table 4). 
Also, the positive impact of the effectiveness of containment measures in 
preventing COVID-19 decease cases seems to fade and even turns to be good for 
growth potentials: effective flattening of the pandemic curve in 2020 increase 
growth prospective already in 2021. Impact of the effectiveness of containment 
measures in preventing COVID-19 death cases appears positive and significant, 
which is a puzzling result. However, an inverse number of decease cases is a more 
direct measure of containment effectiveness than an inverse number of death 
cases, because the number of death cases also reflects conditions of the national 
healthcare system (in countries with advanced healthcare systems, a ratio of 
deaths over deceases is expected to be generally lower). Hence, a possible answer 
to this puzzling result may be simple expectations that countries with 
underdeveloped national healthcare systems may have prolonged exposure of 
population health to the pandemic which in turn reduce potentials for economic 
stabilization. It is also important to mention that the overall explanatory power of 
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this model is quite low (only 5%), so all estimation results have to be taken with 
caution. 
 
Table 4: Estimation results, expected cumulative growth gap 2020-2021 model 
E[gg21] Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| 
E[fbc] -0.1437 0.0980 -1.47 0.145 
E[fbc]2 0.0049 0.0062 0.79 0.430 
CC -0.0071 0.0029 -2.50 0.013 
CD 0.0032 0.0007 4.44 0.000 
_cons -5.2709 0.3134 -16.82 0.000 
Source: Author's calculation 
 
The main limitation of the regression analysis in this work, of course, is the use of 
the IMF estimations and forecasts instead of actual values of economic variables. 
Hence, forecast errors (the difference between forecasted and actual values), 
which are an inevitable result of uncertainty in the future, in this particular case 
may be additionally pronounced as they reflect deficiencies of data inputs and 
limitations of the macroeconomic models used for projections, as well as 
subjective beliefs of the IMF analysts. The second important limitation is that 
deferrals are not counted in the computation of fiscal bailout cost, so they are 
likely overestimated.  
CONCLUSIONS 
When the results of the descriptive and regression analysis are jointly considered, 
a couple of important concluding remarks can be derived: 
 
• The envisaged recovery of economic activity is very slow. The expected 
real growth rate in 2020 is on average 8.2 percentage points lower relative 
to pre-pandemic growth prospective. Cumulative growth gap in 2021 is 
expected to be reduced for only 2.5 percentage points. Assuming the 
constant recovery rate of 2.5 percentage points reduction in cumulative 
growth gap, at least 2-3 years will be needed to catch up the value of 
global economic output that was projected before the pandemic outbreak. 
• Expected fiscal bailout in 2020 appears to be successful in mitigation of 
economic fallout in 2020, but this positive effect seems to fade over short- 
to mid-term. This is the matter of the particular concern: the recent global 
economic crisis has left many countries with high public debt, means of 
monetary policy have been pretty exhausted, and anti-pandemic bailout 
considerably reduced fiscal space for the expansive counter-cyclical fiscal 
policy in the future.  
118 
 
• The effectiveness in the implementation of containment measures to save 
population health tends to reduce growth, as expected. However, the 
finding that effectiveness of containment measures in preventing COVID-
19 decease cases reduces growth only in short-run is encouraging; it 
indicates that effects of containment measures in preventing COVID-19 
death cases on growth reduction are likely to also disappear in the mid-
run. 
 
Putting all conclusions together, one crucial policy recommendation can be 
derived: if the fiscal authorities worldwide aspire to accelerate economic recovery 
without endangering fiscal solvency and population health, future fiscal policy 
actions have to be more selective, tailor-made and focused on the critical 
economic sectors and activities, while government spending on medical means of 
healthcare protection against COVID-19 needs to intensify to gradually eliminate 
the application of strict containment measures. 
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APPENDIX:  
Table A1. Cross-country Data 
 
ISO gg20 gg21 fbc CC_pm CD_pm ISO gg20 gg21 fbc CC_pm CD_pm 
AFG -7.50 -6.26 1.117 1,045.2 38.4 CZE -14.00 -4.82 4.889 2,290.6 39.8 
ALB -13.01 -5.58 3.229 3,268.3 97.6 DNK -12.50 -4.55 7.53 2,876.3 107.5 
DZA -11.39 -3.45 11.316 1,016.9 34.6 DJI -7.50 -2.78 2.46 4,995.4 55.7 
AGO -4.02 -2.83 5.146 87.1 3.6 DMA -8.12 -10.71 2.165 281.7 0.0 
ATG -17.96 -8.75 6.003 1,010.8 32.3 DOM -4.97 -7.45 1.63 9,088.1 162.1 
ARM -6.25 -6.30 2.392 14,746.0 296.1 ECU -10.13 -4.77 7.394 6,581.4 379.6 
ABW -25.80 -5.37 14.829 16,500.0 71.4 EGY -0.88 -7.34 0.771 995.1 54.4 
AUS -12.78 -5.86 8.764 1,004.0 23.9 SLV -9.90 -5.77 5.452 3,823.8 106.4 
AUT -11.51 -6.08 6.814 3,041.1 81.9 GNQ -7.75 6.63 5.652 3,633.1 61.0 
AZE -2.89 -5.79 18.405 3,609.6 52.8 ERI -5.74 -2.08 -0.218 51.6 0.0 
BHS -15.01 -3.73 2.946 5,603.7 112.9 EST -15.37 -6.00 7.707 1,799.1 48.5 
BHR -6.58 -5.21 8.26 34,132.4 125.1 SWZ -2.75 -0.30 2.261 4,090.6 81.6 
BGD -7.51 -3.55 1.303 1,865.8 25.5 ETH -1.10 -7.13 1.195 534.5 8.3 
BRB -14.70 -3.15 3.627 602.8 24.4 FJI -12.80 -5.50 7.852 31.3 2.2 
BLR -9.48 -3.12 1.864 7,565.9 71.3 FIN -9.13 -6.08 6.013 1,463.8 60.7 
BEL -11.49 -5.30 7.688 7,452.7 863.2 FRA -11.65 -5.65 7.067 4,041.0 470.0 
BLZ -19.60 -9.23 4.154 2,374.4 32.0 GAB -4.76 -4.94 2.711 4,088.9 25.5 
BEN -1.46 -3.13 0.95 181.6 3.4 GMB -3.98 -3.22 -1.126 1,190.7 40.9 
BTN -0.20 -7.94 0.681 269.9 0.0 GEO -7.00 -11.16 5.727 400.5 5.1 
BOL -5.80 -7.72 0.235 9,987.4 427.5 DEU -12.10 -4.86 6.676 2,921.3 112.1 
BIH -8.50 -6.94 5.263 5,650.8 169.0 GHA -4.38 -2.62 4.302 1,465.3 9.1 
BWA -12.16 -9.46 3.868 686.7 2.5 GRC -15.10 -9.45 9.2 945.9 24.5 
BRA -8.19 -7.02 2.439 18,318.3 573.7 GRD -14.10 -7.85 4.792 220.2 0.0 
BRN -2.24 -3.58 15.023 322.1 6.7 GTM -7.42 -4.01 1.9 4,196.4 155.6 
BGR -10.04 -4.50 3.663 2,326.1 88.1 GIN -4.69 -1.56 2.539 687.7 4.3 
BFA -3.81 -4.42 3.265 67.3 2.7 GNB -4.50 -8.69 0.696 1,210.0 18.6 
BDI -9.75 -2.57 -0.849 38.6 0.1 GUY 46.52 -32.15 11.377 1,508.3 44.6 
CPV -9.55 -8.94 8.17 6,890.9 71.6 HTI -5.20 -5.56 1.97 729.8 17.9 
KHM -7.64 -9.56 0.816 16.6 0.0 HND -6.40 -5.69 -0.454 6,216.9 192.0 
CMR -5.27 -6.08 2.617 750.5 16.1 HUN -7.30 -5.33 2.065 610.9 62.9 
CAN -10.47 -5.79 10.974 3,408.7 243.3 ISL -13.25 -5.31 5.068 5,896.4 28.0 
CAF -2.95 -5.10 4.102 907.2 11.8 IND -5.55 -5.56 0.177 2,678.9 47.7 
TCD -6.23 -4.62 1.432 79.1 6.0 IDN -7.71 -1.82 3.181 644.4 27.5 
CHL -9.76 -5.79 4.243 21,456.7 588.5 IRN -9.10 -4.09 5.128 4,486.3 257.7 
CHN -8.03 -1.57 4.625 64.6 3.4 IRQ -11.92 -6.45 20.834 5,910.2 177.9 
COL -6.13 -6.26 1.792 11,907.3 378.4 IRL -13.06 -7.69 5.826 5,810.1 359.0 
COM -4.26 -6.11 2.12 484.0 8.0 ISR -11.27 -7.95 6.487 12,545.9 104.5 
COD -5.78 -6.19 1.237 102.1 2.6 ITA -13.96 -6.06 5.945 4,443.6 587.8 
COG -5.71 -3.68 2.112 871.1 17.1 JAM -9.11 -5.04 1.728 735.0 6.6 
CRI -6.26 -5.82 1.659 7,816.3 82.3 JPN -8.18 -3.23 4.289 537.8 10.1 
CIV -6.00 -3.18 2.244 683.1 4.4 JOR -7.39 -5.28 3.463 195.2 1.5 
HRV -13.97 -9.81 6.999 2,493.3 45.3 KAZ -6.66 -6.27 5.192 7,011.5 95.6 
CYP -12.07 -6.91 2.088 1,697.5 24.0 KEN -5.12 -5.01 0.896 689.9 11.6 
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Table A1. Cross-country Data - continued 
 
ISO gg20 gg21 fbc CC_pm CD_pm ISO gg20 gg21 fbc CC_pm CD_pm 
KOR -4.58 -2.84 1.316 384.7 6.2 PRT -13.00 -6.52 7.101 5,627.7 177.2 
UVK -12.50 -6.04 1.498 7,383.9 281.1 PRI -7.50 -3.13 0.903 10,368.7 137.0 
KWT -4.54 -3.49 16.843 18,003.8 112.7 QAT -9.38 -5.39 2.231 43,071.2 71.6 
KGZ -12.03 -3.68 7.485 6,870.9 165.8 ROU -8.90 -7.90 4.659 4,445.5 183.3 
LAO -4.88 -7.32 2.01 3.1 0.0 RUS -8.96 -6.11 5.662 6,783.3 117.1 
LVA -16.89 -6.81 4.71 722.1 17.6 RWA -3.15 -6.58 4.887 324.8 1.3 
LSO -10.33 -3.86 -1.489 520.5 15.1 SMR -17.57 -8.73 3.613 21,617.6 1,235.3 
LBR -6.53 -1.40 -1.63 284.6 17.9 STP -11.50 -8.47 2.872 4,036.0 67.6 
LBY -139.3 -25.3 -18.16 2,040.6 35.3 SAU -5.21 -3.88 7.922 9,237.2 113.5 
LTU -16.24 -5.84 7.949 1,032.3 30.9 SEN -2.50 -5.54 2.187 808.5 16.9 
LUX -9.74 -5.80 3.49 10,789.9 202.0 SRB -10.49 -3.92 7.36 4,503.2 102.1 
MDG -4.62 -5.30 0.928 548.6 7.1 SYC -18.87 -11.27 16.446 1,364.6 0.0 
MWI -1.50 -7.36 2.246 272.9 8.6 SLE -6.31 -8.07 2.062 261.3 9.0 
MYS -10.70 -2.37 3.627 284.6 3.8 SGP -6.43 -3.19 7.227 10,012.5 4.8 
MDV -21.27 -7.83 6.445 20,610.2 75.3 SVK -11.16 -7.07 5.08 711.1 6.1 
MLI -2.60 -4.42 5.064 145.2 6.6 SVN -13.49 -8.78 6.926 1,384.7 61.9 
MLT -9.83 -4.22 8.665 3,839.2 22.7 ZAF -9.80 -4.57 6.463 10,626.0 238.5 
MRT -6.17 -9.96 2.019 1,730.4 39.2 SSD 1.67 -5.37 -0.709 188.9 3.5 
MUS -12.70 -9.21 8.055 273.1 7.9 ESP -12.28 -7.65 7.617 9,951.7 624.1 
MEX -9.65 -7.04 2.159 4,698.8 506.8 LKA -4.72 -4.31 2.974 137.3 0.5 
MDA -7.10 -6.77 2.65 10,361.4 280.1 SDN -4.19 -7.48 12.435 305.1 19.0 
MNG -9.00 -3.86 5.135 91.2 0.0 SUR -9.80 -5.20 -2.288 6,612.0 112.0 
MNE -15.45 -8.55 10.958 7,731.9 158.9 SWE -11.96 -5.51 5.844 8,160.3 565.0 
MAR -8.52 -7.12 3.719 1,725.3 31.2 CHE -9.74 -5.31 6.229 4,904.2 201.8 
MOZ -2.50 -3.28 3.564 122.6 0.7 TJK -4.50 -2.65 3.179 920.1 7.3 
MMR -5.74 -3.18 0.684 14.6 0.1 TZA -2.55 -5.37 0.098 9.0 0.4 
NAM -5.68 -3.39 0.99 2,995.1 29.3 THA -12.73 -7.60 3.246 50.2 0.9 
NPL -2.47 -4.78 1.63 1,355.2 7.8 TLS -6.80 -9.35 -0.732 20.8 0.0 
NLD -10.48 -7.92 6.951 4,066.6 360.7 TGO -3.00 -5.96 0.503 170.3 3.3 
NZL -13.15 -7.09 5.275 275.4 4.4 TTO -7.14 -5.87 5.364 1,218.7 15.2 
NIC -6.00 -5.10 1.176 560.5 21.0 TUN -8.36 -5.75 0.648 312.7 6.4 
NER -7.16 -2.84 0.82 50.4 3.0 TUR -10.00 -6.32 2.546 3,234.6 76.2 
NGA -5.78 -6.23 2.033 268.0 5.0 UGA -0.73 -4.82 -1.882 72.5 0.8 
MKD -11.00 -3.94 3.522 6,892.7 288.6 UKR -11.30 -10.69 7.265 2,895.1 61.1 
NOR -9.22 -7.56 7.207 1,968.4 49.3 ARE -6.77 -5.64 9.319 6,483.4 35.5 
OMN -5.82 -8.12 9.969 19,866.2 157.2 GBR -10.54 -5.74 6.804 5,002.0 620.6 
PAK -3.52 -5.03 -1.646 1,445.1 30.7 USA -10.65 -5.32 9.603 17,916.8 551.8 
PAN -6.08 -9.40 3.926 21,649.0 470.0 URY -8.00 -3.52 2.184 446.1 12.5 
PNG -3.88 -3.22 0.506 53.4 0.6 UZB -5.20 -3.43 3.631 1,261.2 9.6 
PRY -5.00 -5.45 4.29 2,303.1 41.1 VNM -4.30 -3.53 0.969 10.9 0.3 
PER -9.78 -7.29 5.447 19,677.3 880.3 YEM -9.10 -12.95 1.164 61.8 17.9 
PHL -6.97 -4.66 1.302 2,007.2 32.5 ZMB -5.86 -4.69 0.308 656.4 15.7 
POL -8.81 -6.40 5.053 1,761.0 53.5 ZWE -9.90 -10.36 1.631 430.2 13.1 
Source: IMF, WHO and author's calculation 
 
Note: gg20 – expected real growth in 2020, gg21 –expected cumulative real growth in 
2020-2021, fbc – fiscal bailout cost, CC_pm – COVID-19 cases per million persons, CD_pm – 
COVID-19 deaths per million persons; 
Expected growth gap outliers are marked in italic and bold. 
 
